I blog therefore I remember

Part 1, Chapter 4: 'The Crackdown' (Pp. 33-34)

On the night of June 3rd, while sitting in the courtyard with my family, I heard intense gunfire. A tragedy to shock the world had not been averted, and was happening after all.

I prepared the above written material three years after the June Fourth tragedy. Many years have now passed since this tragedy. Of the activists involved in this incident, except for the few who escaped abroad, most were arrested, sentenced, and repeatedly interrogated. The truth must have been determined by now. Certainly the following three questions should have been answered by now.

First, it was determined then that the student movement was “a planned conspiracy” of anti-Party, anti-socialist elements with leadership. So now we must ask, who were these leaders? What was the plan? What was the conspiracy? What evidence exists to support this? It was also said that there were “black hands” within the Party. Then who were they?

Second, it was said that this event was aimed at overthrowing the People’s Republic and the Communist Party. Where is the evidence? I had said at the time that most people were only asking us to correct our flaws, not attempting to overthrow our political system. After so many years, what evidence has been obtained through the interrogations? Have I been proven right, or have they? Many of the democracy activists in exile say that before June Fourth, they had still believed that the Party could improve itself. After June Fourth, however, they saw the Party as hopeless and only then did they take a stand to oppose the Party. During the demonstrations, students raised many slogans and demands, but the problem of inflation was conspicuously missing, though inflation was a hot topic that could easily have resonated with and ignited all of society. If the students had intended on opposing the Communist Party back then, why hadn’t they utilized this sensitive topic? If intent on mobilizing the masses, wouldn’t it have been easier to raise questions like this one? In hindsight, it’s obvious that the reason the students did not raise the issue of inflation was that they knew that this issue was related to the reform program, and if pointedly raised to mobilize the masses, it could have turned out to obstruct the reform process.

Third, can it be proven that the June Fourth movement was “counterrevolutionary turmoil,” as it was designated? The students were orderly. Many reports indicate that on the occasions when the People’s Liberation Army came under attack, in many incidents it was the students who had come to its defense. Large numbers of city residents blocked the PLA from entering the city. Why? Were they intent on overthrowing the republic?

Of course, whenever there are large numbers of people involved, there will always be some tiny minority within the crowd who might want to attack the PLA. It was a chaotic situation. It is perfectly possible that some hooligans took advantage of the situation to make trouble, but how can these actions be attributed to the majority of the citizens and students? By now, the answer to this question should be clear.

Part 4, Chapter 2: 'Zhao Walks the Line' (Pp. 189-190)

Another issue was how to deal with people implicated in all of this. The Anti-Liberalization Campaign was not just a theoretical issue. My biggest headaches came from the issues of whether to punish people, how to reduce the harm done to people, and how to contain the circle of people being harmed. From the beginning of the campaign, some Party elders were also very enthusiastic and wanted to punish a lot of people. Deng Xiaoping had always believed that those who proceeded with liberalization within the Party should be severely punished. Wang Zhen and other elders believed this as well. People like Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu were even more eager to take the opportunity to destroy certain people and take pleasure in the aftermath.

Under these circumstances, it was difficult to protect certain people, or limit the number being hurt or even to reduce the degree of harm that was done. Hence when it was drafted, the Number Four Document set strict limits on the punishment of those designated by the campaign as having made mistakes. The document defined this as: “Punishments that will be publicized and administrative punishments must first be approved by the Central Committee, and are to be meted out to those few Party members who openly promote bourgeois liberalism, refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonitions, and have extensive influence.” The document also stated, “For those who hold some mistaken views, criticisms by fellow Party members may be carried out in Party group administrative meetings. They should be allowed to hold to their own views and the method of carrying out the criticism must be calm.”

At the meeting of national Propaganda Department leaders and on other occasions, I also spoke on how to win over the vast majority of people in the theoretical and cultural domains. I suggested we cooperate even with people with biased or false ideas. I pointed out, “Among Party members working in the theoretical and cultural fields, there are those who clearly uphold the Four Cardinal Principles but are a bit conservative and rigid; some are enthusiastic about reform yet have made statements that are inappropriate. We cannot just label the former as dogmatic or the latter as pursuers of liberalization. We should educate and cooperate with them all.”

When proceeding with the Anti-Liberalization Campaign, I had intentionally emphasized that we should classify those who had taken faulty liberal actions as well as those who were too conservative and rigid into the same group of people who were too biased. The purpose was to avoid or reduce the harm being done to people.

Part 4, Chapter 4: 'Preparing for the Main Event' (Pp. 205-206)

Nevertheless, we had practiced socialism for more than thirty years. For those intent on observing orthodox socialist principles, how were we to explain this? One possible explanation was that socialism had been implemented too early and that we needed to retrench and reinitiate democracy. Another was that China had implemented socialism without having first experienced capitalism, and so a dose of capitalism needed to be reintroduced.

Neither argument was entirely unreasonable, but they had the potential of sparking major theoretical debates, which could have led to confusion. And arguments of this kind could never have won political approval. In the worst-case scenario, they could even have caused reform to be killed in its infancy.

While planning for the 13th Party Congress report in the spring of 1987, I spent a lot of time thinking about how to resolve this issue. I came to believe that the expression “initial stage of socialism” was the best approach, and not only because it accepted and cast our decades-long implementation of socialism in a positive light; at the same time, because we were purportedly defined as being in an “initial stage,” we were totally freed from the restrictions of orthodox socialist principles. Therefore, we could step back from our previous position and implement reform policies more appropriate to China.

Part 3, Chapter 4: 'Finding a New Approach' (Pp. 112-113)

The reason I had such a deep interest in economic reform and devoted myself to finding ways to undertake this reform was that I was determined to eradicate the malady of China’s economic system at its roots. Without an understanding of the deficiencies of China’s economic system, I could not possibly have had such a strong urge for reform.

Of course, my earliest understanding of how to proceed with reform was shallow and vague. Many of the approaches that I proposed could only ease the symptoms; they could not tackle the fundamental problems.

The most profound realization I had about eradicating deficiencies in China’s economy was that the system had to be transformed into a market economy, and that the problem of property rights had to be resolved. That was arrived at through practical experience, only after a long series of back-and-forths.

But what was the fundamental problem? In the beginning, it wasn’t clear to me. My general sense was only that efficiency had to be improved. After I came to Beijing, my guiding principle on economic policy was not the single-minded pursuit of production figures, nor the pace of economic development, but rather finding a way for the Chinese people to receive concrete returns on their labor. That was my starting point. Growth rates of 2 to 3 percent would have been considered fantastic for advanced capitalist nations, but while our economy grew at a rate of 10 percent, our people’s living standards had not improved.

As for how to define this new path, I did not have any preconceived model or a systematic idea in mind. I started with only the desire to improve economic efficiency. This conviction was very important. The starting point was higher efficiency, and people seeing practical gains. Having this as a goal, a suitable way was eventually found, after much searching. Gradually, we created the right path.

Part 3, Chapter 7: 'One Step at a Time' (P. 126)

In summary, there were two aspects: one was the market economic sector outside of the planning system, and the other was the planned economic sector. While expanding the market sector, we reduced the planned sector. While both planned and market sector existed, it was inevitable that as one grew the other shrank. As the planned sector was reduced and weakened, the market sector expanded and strengthened.

At the time, the major components of the market sector were agriculture, rural products, light industries, textiles, and consumer products. Products involved with the means of production were mostly still controlled by state-owned enterprises.

If the enterprises that controlled the means of production were not weakened or reduced, if a portion was not taken out to feed the market sector, growth could not continue for the emerging market economic sector. If no part of the means of production was allowed to be directly sold on the free market; for example, if small enterprises producing coal or concrete were all under central control; then the new emerging market sector would have run into great difficulties for lack of raw materials and supplies. Therefore, for more than ten years, though there was no fundamental change to the planned economic system and the system of state-owned enterprises, the incremental changes in the transition from planned to market economies had an undeniably positive effect.

Part 6, Chapter 5: 'The Way Forward' (P. 270)

Of course, it is possible that in the future a more advanced political system than parliamentary democracy will emerge. But that is a matter for the future. At present, there is no other.

Based on this, we can say that if a country wishes to modernize, not only should it implement a market economy, it must also adopt a parliamentary democracy as its political system. Otherwise, this nation will not be able to have a market economy that is healthy and modern, nor can it become a modern society with a rule of law. Instead it will run into the situations that have occurred in so many developing countries, including China: commercialization of power, rampant corruption, a society polarized between rich and poor.

Part 3, Chapter 3: 'Opening Painfully to the World' (P. 107)

In hindsight, it was not easy for China to carry out the Reform and Open-Door Policy. Whenever there were issues involving relationships with foreigners, people were fearful, and there were many accusations made against reformers: people were afraid of being exploited, having our sovereignty undermined, or suffering an insult to our nation.

I pointed out that when foreigners invest money in China, they fear that China’s policies might change. But what do we have to fear?

Published by Simon & Schuster, 2009

中央審查趙紫陽文件首曝光

【明報專訊】根據中共已故前總書記趙紫陽生前錄音整理的回憶錄、即將出版的中文版《改革歷程》，首度披露中共內部就30條問題審查趙紫陽的文件——《在1989年政治動亂中涉及到趙紫陽同志的有關問題》，因無法自圓其說，該文件從來未對外公開。

從這份文件中可以看出，八九民運期間，中共高層內部就對《人民日報》「4．26社論」存在重大分歧，趙紫陽等人一直堅持要修訂該社論對學生運動的定性，而鄧小平為首的一派則堅持不肯退讓，直到北京實行戒嚴，趙已被實質奪權後，仍然盡最後的努力，希望力挽狂瀾。

六四事件後，1989年6月23日至24日在北京召開的中共十三屆四中全會，李鵬在會上代表中央政治局提出的《關於趙紫陽同志在反黨反社會主義的動亂中所犯錯誤的報告》，指趙紫陽「在關係黨和國家生死存亡的關鍵時刻犯了支持動亂和分裂黨的錯誤，對動亂的形成和發展負有不可推卸的責任」，全會據此撤銷他的所有職務，「對他的問題繼續進行審查」。

趙促改變「4．26社論」定性

李鵬的報告及對趙紫陽審查的結果一直未對外公布，在錄音回憶錄中，趙紫陽質問：審查3年，既然要結束，為什麽公布審查的事實？實際上就是害怕。他又指出，1990年6月21日，處理其專案的審查組長、中共元老王任重把審查他的30條問題文件交給他。趙紫陽說，「這30條且不說其中有許多與事實有出入，即使全部是事實，我看也不能根據這30條作出他們給我的結論。」

這份首度公開的文件，對1989年5月以後中共高層的內部鬥爭有詳盡描述。其中透露，1989年5月17日下午，當中央政治局常委會議决定調軍隊進北京實施戒嚴後，趙紫陽立即簽發辭職信，被時任中央軍委常務副主席楊尚昆勸阻後，趙於次日（18日）收回辭職信，但他仍然寫信給鄧小平，繼續要求改變「4．26社論」對學生運動的定性。

5月19日晚，趙紫陽缺席宣布戒嚴的大會，他雖已「請假」，但仍未放棄扭轉局勢的努力。5月21日，他批准全國人大常委黨組的建議，致電正在外訪的全國人大委員長萬里，要他提前回國。當日上午，趙紫陽對中共中央書記處書記閻明復說，學潮拖下去，曠日持久，結果難料，只有召開人大常委會來緩解。當日趙紫陽又想「開一次政治局會議」。根據其他史料記載，就在當天，中共元老已經開會，決定以上海市委書記江澤民取代趙紫陽。

與鄧小平等保守派交鋒

1989年4月15日，中共前總書記胡耀邦病逝後，大批學生上街遊行，要求重新評價胡耀邦，4月26日《人民日報》發表題為《必須旗幟鮮明地反對動亂》，指學運為「動亂」，即著名的「4．26社論」。趙紫陽4月30日從朝鮮訪問回國後，就一直圍繞修改「4．26社論」的定性，與鄧小平等保守派展開激烈交鋒。

這份文件又披露，趙紫陽不滿時任上海市委書記江澤民4月26日停止《世界經濟導報》發行並整頓其編輯部的處理，指摘他「把事情搞糟了，搞被動了」，並當面對江說，「我不給你們壓力，但我也不管此事，由你們自己處理」。

欲借學潮推動政治改革

從文件中可見，趙紫陽曾想借處理學潮為契機，推動中國的政治改革，如5月6日上午，他曾召集主管文宣的胡啟立、芮杏文說，目前新聞自由是一個焦點……看來新聞公開程度增加一點，風險不大，又說「面對國內人心所向，面對國際進步潮流，我們只能因勢利導」。5月12日，《人民日報》頭版頭條就以《改革要過市場關民主關》作為醒目標題。

不敢公開的審查報告

——摘自趙紫陽錄音回憶錄《改革歷程》

【明報專訊】趙紫陽回應：

他們結束對我的審查，無論是政治局也好，中央全會也好，什麽材料也沒有發。審查3年，既然要結束，為什麽不把審查的事實公布？實際上就是害怕。

經過3年多的審查，究竟查出什麽問題呢？1990年6月21日，王任重a把審查我的30個問題的材料給我，並給我寫了封信說，有什麽不同意見，可以提出來，寫在材料上，退給他。材料的題目是《在1989年政治動亂中涉及到趙紫陽同志的有關問題》。

這就是他們經過長期審查以後，認為我支持動亂和分裂黨的所謂事實和證據。這30條且不說其中有許多與事實有出入，即使全部是事實，我看也不能根據這30條作出他們給我的結論。

《在1989年政治動亂中涉及到趙紫陽同志的有關問題》

（1）4月15日晚，胡啓立、芮杏文同志向紫陽同志彙報了胡耀邦同志逝世後出現的情况，可能在各地發生政治性的遊行和集會，有人可能借此鬧事，建議中央發個通知，提醒各地注意。紫陽對可能發生的動亂不予重視，認為沒有這個必要。4月16日公安部認為事態可能嚴重發展，在公安系統內部發了個電報，向各地打招呼。

（2）在胡耀邦同志治喪期間，動亂現象日益明顯，中央和北京市許多同志認為事態已發生變化，多次向趙紫陽提出，中央應有明確的方針和對策，以制止事態的發展，但他始終迴避對事情的性質認真討論。直到4月23日他出訪朝鮮前，中央的同志再次建議他開一次會，他仍不接受。

（3）4月19日上海《世界經濟導報》和《新觀察》雜誌社聯合召開了追悼胡耀邦同志的座談會，公然否定反對資產階級自由化的鬥爭，說反自由化鬥爭不得人心，攻擊中央領導同志，要脅中央承認錯誤，首先集中地提出了政治動亂的綱領。4月24日，《世界經濟導報》對這次座談會作了詳細報道，並搶先印發，與北京動亂相呼應。4月26日，上海市委責令這期《導報》停止發行，並決定對報社整頓，這是完全正確的。但趙紫陽訪朝回國後，對這一決定不僅不予支持，反而指摘上海市委把事情搞糟了，搞被動了。5月2日，他與費孝通等民主黨派幾位負責人談起這件事時，他說，最好雙方體面找下台階，淡化處理，對上海打個招呼，適當讓一點。5月11日，他與江澤民等同志談及《世界經濟導報》時又說，我不給你們壓力，但我也不管此事，由你們自己處理。如果有人問我，我就說不知道。

（4）5月3日，趙紫陽同志在紀念「五四」運動70周年大會發表講話前，楊尚昆、李鵬、姚依林d、李錫銘e等同志認為，當時已經發生和正在發展的這場「反黨反社會主義」動亂，正是資產階級自由化長期氾濫的惡果。因此一再提出在趙的講話中，應針對動亂製造者提出的政治綱領，加上明確反對資產階級自由化的內容，但遭到趙的拒絕。

（5）4月23日，趙訪朝前找鮑彤f談話，要他注意學潮的動向。4月30日趙返回北京，鮑彤立即找趙彙報情况，說4．26社論寫得太生硬，沒有充分說理，激化了中間狀態學生的對立情緒。幾天後趙對鮑說，看來4．26社論確有缺點。

（6）5月1日，趙向他的秘書李勇問起學潮的情况，當談到4．27學生遊行時，趙說，這說明學生對社論不滿，但中央已作出決定，要想改變社論比較難。

（7）5月2日下午，趙紫陽與民主黨派負責人費孝通、雷潔瓊、孫起孟座談學潮問題。當時中央已明確提出必須旗幟鮮明地反對動亂的方針，趙紫陽本應明確貫徹中央的方針，但會上有人提出，不加分析地把學生運動出現的問題說成是動亂是不合適的，趙不但不做思想工作，反而說「你們今天談的意見對我們認識問題有幫助」，表示同意他們的看法。座談會後，趙對閻明復g同志說，《人民日報》4．26社論定性定錯了，看來政治局常委的同志向小平彙報時，只是單方面反映了北京市委的看法，現在這個彎子很難轉，關鍵在於如何說服小平同志，只要他說一句看來當時把問題看得重了些，這樣就可以在常委裏統一思想，就可以在黨內轉彎子。趙要閻把他的這個想法告訴楊尚昆同志，希望尚昆同志最好和他一起去見鄧小平同志。當晚，閻明復同志見過楊尚昆同志後告訴趙說，尚昆同志表示小平同志對動亂看法是經過反覆考慮的，是不能改變的。

（8）5月3日上午，趙紫陽與楊尚昆同志談4．26社論問題。談後趙對他的秘書李勇說，看來改正社論有困難，要慢慢淡化，慢慢轉彎子。

（9）5月4日上午，趙紫陽口授由鮑彤整理了趙在會見亞行年會（本報編註﹕亞洲開發銀行理事會年會）代表的講話稿。趙在沒有徵求常委任何同志意見的情况下，當天下午擅自發表了一篇同中央制止動亂方針完全相違背的講話。當時已經出現了嚴重的動亂，他卻說：「中國不會出現大的動亂，我對此具有充分的信心。」中央明確指出，這場動亂的實質是否定共產黨的領導，否定社會主義制度。他卻說，他們絕對不是要反對我們的根本制度，而是要求我們把工作中的弊病改掉。在已有種種事實說明極少數人在利用學潮搞動亂的情况下，他還是說，有人企圖利用學生的行動，當然這是難免的。講話後，趙親自交代新華社記者，他的講話稿要全文照發。這就把他與中央的分歧暴露於世。講話發表後，廣大幹部、黨員和群衆反映，中央出了兩個聲音，引起了思想混亂。一些高校又宣布罷課，遊行示威的浪潮重新掀起，整個局勢更加惡化。

（10）5月5日上午，趙紫陽同志約北京大學校長丁石孫、北京師範大學副校長許嘉璐談話。趙說，「對當前學潮，我在亞行年會上講話有意減輕分量，現在不要去討論運動的性質，說實話，一小撮是誰，我們也不知道。」

（11）5月5日下午，趙紫陽同志自行決定去參加民盟中央召開的北京部分高校中青年教師盟員座談會。會上有人提出不同意4．26社論，贊成趙在亞行年會講話等意見。在會議結束時，趙說大家講得好，謝謝。對會上發表的意見表示肯定。

（12）在動亂局勢更加惡化，有些報刊的宣傳報道出現明顯錯誤傾向的情况下，5月6日上午，趙紫陽找胡啓立、芮杏文談話，他說，目前新聞自由是一個焦點，前段時間的新聞報道，可以總結一些經驗。前段時間控制得嚴一點，後一段時間放開了一點，對遊行作了報道，看來新聞公開程度增加一點，風險不大。他甚至說，面對國內人心所向，面對國際進步潮流，我們只能因勢利導。這次學潮反映出一個問題，人民强烈要求改革，擔心改革全面停頓。5月9日，胡啓立把趙的講話整理成要點，並經趙審定同意，向新聞單位傳達。5月12日，胡啓立、芮杏文同志在首都新聞單位負責人的對話會上作了傳達。當時，首都新聞單位已有1000多人簽名並上街遊行，有的報紙發表了攻擊黨和政府的文章。傳達這次談話，使宣傳輿論更加失控。《人民日報》等許多新聞單位對遊行、靜坐、絕食等情况作大量報道，促使聲援遊行的人愈來愈多，北京的社會秩序陷於一片混亂。

（13）4月21日和5月2日，趙紫陽同志先後兩次找杜潤生h同志談學潮問題。此後，杜潤生同志在科學會堂兩次召開有10多人參加的會議，談了趙的意見，討論了處理學潮的看法和建議。趙對大家的建議很贊成，並要把這次學潮作為解決若干社會關心的重要問題的契機。

（14）5月8日，中央政治局常委開會，聽取制止動亂小組的彙報，本應討論如何採取堅決措施制止動亂的問題。但趙紫陽卻着重談了許多所謂反腐敗的意見。5月10日政治局召開會議，趙在會上通報了5月8日常委會情况，提出關於反腐敗和政治體制改革的6條具體措施。這些措施並未經過常委會討論同意。

（15）在兩次會上，幾次討論如何對待非法學生組織問題，趙紫陽同志說，有些地方學生會不能得到多數擁護，可以改選，不要怕改選中他上台，我下台。

（16）5月9日和10日，在北京召開了一個當代社會主義研究問題的座談會，會上提出社會主義改革要過好市場關和民主關。對社會主義民主、自由和人權問題，都要提到理論研究的重要位置上來。趙紫陽會見了參加座談會同志並講了話。他說，這次學生遊行鬧事，要汲取的主要教訓是必須加快政治體制改革的進程。5月12日，《人民日報》頭版頭條以《改革要過市場關民主關》作為醒目標題，報道了這次會議新聞。實際上為動亂提供了理論根據，助長了動亂的升級。

（17）5月16日下午，趙紫陽同志會見戈爾巴喬夫i時，一開頭他就說，在重要政治問題上仍要鄧小平掌舵，十三大以來，我們在處理最重大的問題時，總是向小平同志通報，向他請教。他還說，這是他第一次公開透露中國黨的這個決定。這個講話發表的第二天，遊行示威的標語口號就集中攻擊鄧小平同志。「打倒鄧小平」、「擁護趙紫陽」等標語口號，充斥遊行隊伍和天安門廣場。

（18）5月16日晚，中央政治局常委召開緊急會議，趙紫陽同志提出要向學生承認4．26社論是錯誤的，可以說社論稿曾發到朝鮮，經他批准，由他承擔責任。他反覆强調，4．26社論是有問題的，必須有一個說法，如果不走這一步，我們這個棋是走不下去的。這個局面轉不過來，沒有出路。

（19）5月17日下午，中央政治局常委再次召開會議，趙紫陽同志仍然堅持錯誤意見，常委多數同志堅決反對，認為再退就會發生全國大動亂，後果不堪設想。鄧小平同志堅決支持政治局常委多數同志意見，為了制止動亂，會議決定立即調一部分軍隊進駐北京，對北京部分地區實行戒嚴。趙卻認為戒嚴將帶來嚴重後果，表示無法執行。

（20）5月17日下午常委會以後，趙紫陽同志不顧常委會決定，竟然立即提出辭職。他要鮑彤為他起草辭職信，經趙簽名後立即發出。當受到楊尚昆同志的批評後，趙於次日又收回了辭職信。

（21）5月17日的常委會議，是中央對制止動亂作出重大部署的重要會議。鄧小平同志特別强調，到會同志必須嚴肅、嚴格保密。但是趙紫陽同志會後向鮑彤和秘書張岳琦說，「下午常委會作了決策，我今天在會上受到尖銳批評，我原來主張對4．26社論的提法鬆鬆口，好做工作，但被否定了，常委批評我說，5月4日的講話，把事情鬧大了，我保留了意見」。他還對鮑彤說，李鵬同志在會上批評鮑彤有泄密行為。鮑彤回到政治體制改革研究室後，立即召開部分人員會議，說有人說他有泄密行為，他將被停止工作，受中央審查，表示向大家告別。他向少數人泄露了中央常委有分歧、趙的主張被否決的信息。

（22）5月18日，趙紫陽給鄧小平寫信，繼續要求改變4．26社論的定性。信中說，「學生答應停止絕食的最關鍵的要求，就是摘帽子，改變4．26社論的定性，承認他們的行動是愛國的運動。我反覆考慮，覺得我們必須痛下決心作出這個讓步」。

（23）5月19日凌晨，趙紫陽同志去天安門廣場看望絕食的學生。他告訴學生關於學潮的性質、責任問題，終究是可以得到解決的。他還說，你們還年輕，來日方長，你們不像我們，我們已經老了，無所謂了。這就透露了黨的最高領導層存在分歧，他可能要下台的消息。

（24）5月19日晚，黨中央和國務院召開首都黨政機關幹部大會，宣布中央關於採取果斷措施堅決制止動亂的決策。開會前，中央政治局常委曾一再動員趙紫陽同志參加這個大會，但趙拒絕出席，這就暴露了他同黨公開鬧分裂的主張。

（25）5月19日，人大常委黨組向中央政治局常委寫報告請示，鑑於目前的嚴重局面，建議萬里j同志中止國外訪問，立即回國。5月21日，胡啓立問趙紫陽同志，對人大常委黨組的報告如何答覆。當時趙已請假休息，他不同主持中央工作並分管外事工作的李鵬同志商量，就個人同意發電報，要萬里同志提前回國。

（26）5月21日上午，趙紫陽對閻明復同志說，學潮這樣拖下去，曠日持久，結果難以預料，只有召開人大常委會來緩解。

（27）5月21日，趙紫陽還對他的秘書李勇同志說，我想還是應該開一次政治局會議，並要鮑彤為他起草一個講話稿。

（28）【編者註：錄音遺漏】

（29）趙紫陽同志强調，對文藝作品要少管，少介入。

（30）一些長期頑固堅持資產階級自由化立場的人，曾經受到趙紫陽的讚賞、重用和包庇，其中嚴家其1、陳一諮2等人，在這次動亂中成為策劃動亂和組織陰謀活動的重要人物。平息反革命暴亂以後，這些人就潛逃國外，瘋狂地繼續反對中國共產黨和社會主義中國的活動。一貫得到趙信任和重用的鮑彤，在宣布戒嚴以後，與陳一諮等人一起攻擊李鵬等黨和國家領導同志。

註﹕

（1）嚴家其（1942-）：江蘇常州人。政治學學者。1979年在胡耀邦主持召開的「理論務虛會」上提出「廢除黨和國家最高領導職務終身制」。時任中國社會科學院政治學研究所所長。「六四」事件以後被迫流亡，曾任總部在巴黎的「民主中國陣線」首任主席。現居美國

（2）陳一諮（1940-）：陝西三原人。時任國家經濟體制改革委員會體改研究所所長，中國政治體制改革研究會副會長。1989年「六四」事件中，陳一諮在5月19日組織發表了署名「三所一會」（經濟體制改革研究所、農研中心發展研究所、中信公司國際問題研究所以及北京青年經濟學會）的《關於時局的六點聲明》，反對暴力鎮壓，事後被迫流亡美國

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